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INDEPENDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
IN CANADA:
IN PRAISE OF
"STRUCTURAL HERETICS"

H. N. Janisch I

/

In this article the relationship between government and
independent regulatory agencies is analyzed in the context of current
It concludes
concerns for more political accountability in regulation.
that not enough care is being taken to preserve the integrity of such
agencies and makes a number of specific recommendations as to how
both political accountability and independence may be achieved.

1.

Introduction

"Independence" is a word replete with positive meaning. We
would all like to be told that we display independence of thought and
action. In our individualistic society, independence of spirit and
way of living are much admired. This is carried over into our
institutions -- particularly to those close to us here today. We all
believe in the crucial importance to a free society of an independent
legal profession and in the value of academic independence in our
universities. Above all, we believe in the independence of the
judiciary as a cornerstone of our liberties. In all these matters,
echo Daniel Webster:
"Independence now and
we would enthusiastical
Independence forever"!
The whole notion of independence carries with it very
positive connotations and enhanced prestige and standing in the
community. As lawyers, for example, we like the idea of belonging to
an independent profession, at least partially because of the social

1/ Of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. This paper was
originally presented at a conference of the Council of Canadian
Administrative Tribunals/Conseil des Tribuneaux Administratifs
Canadiens held at Queen's University on May 5, 1987.
This article first appeared in 1 Canadian Jol. of Administrative
Law Practice 1 (1987) and is reprinted here by permission.
2/ Discourse in Commemoration of Adams and Jefferson, Boston,
August 2, 1826.

I am sure that many of us here today would like to
status involved.
be able to assert the independence of administrative tribunals,
because by doing so, we would be confirming their uniqueness and
importance.
We would prefer that they not be merely seen as part of
government, but as distinct entities entitled to the sort of respect
and deference society accords the judiciary.
But is the notion of independence at all applicable to
administrative tribunals? Are they involved in detached, disinterested judgment, or with the implementation of government social and
regulatory programs in a reasonably even-handed manner? As
Bernard Schwartz observed, "[plaradoxical though it may at first
glance appear, the prime aim of administrative justice is not justice
at all, but the exeption of the legislative policy embodied in the
relevant statute." This requires us to confront, of course, the prime characteristic of administrative tribunals -- their extraordinary variety,
which makes any generalization a perilous undertaking. It must
surely be this chameleon-like quality of administrative tribunals,
whose activities cause them to range from being more punctiliously
court-like than the courts themselves to pure policy making through
informal consultation, that makes them such a fascinating and challenging area in which to work or study. While it is fun, particularly
for an academic, to revel in all this variety, we do need some
classifications. One possible way of differentiating between tribunals is by focusing on what they do.
The products of these agencies vary as greatly as their
Here is a long list, which
subjects and structure.
includes the major kinds of products, although probably not
all of them:
(1) adjudicating:
that is, making individualized decisions, for example, about claims for workers'
compensation, about the rates for telephone service or
natural gas, about the construction of a nuclear power
Some of
plant, and about granting and revoking licences.
these decisions are similar to decisions made by courts;
for example, a decision about workers' compensation determines facts about individuals and applies general standards

Alfred Knopf,
3/ The Professor and the Commissions (New York:
"[t]he ultimate test of the
1959), p. 117.
As James Landis put it:
administrative agency is the policy that it formulates; not the
fairness as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy
on a record of their own making."
The Administrative Process
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1938), p. 39.
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about entitlement to these facts. In contrast, some of the
decisions are greatly different from decisions made by
courts; for example, a decision made by an environmental
assessment board about a nuclear power plant will involve
general facts about the economy and complex technology and
a large element of choice about social values; (2) rule
making: that is, rules made under statutory authority and
having substantially the same effect as legislation,
whether they are called regulations, by-laws, delegated
legislation, or any other technical term; (3) policy making
through informal statements; (4) prosecuting: for example,
prosecuting for violation of environmental requirements;
(5) spending money; (6) providing services; (7) investigating
(8) researching; (9) advising; (10) educating; (11) perSome agencies, especially
suading; and (12) supervising.
the major federal regulatory agencies, perform all or most
of these functions; others perform only a few, although,
because they overlap so much, it would be dficult to
imagine an agency that performed only one. From this it is possible to argue that where a tribunal is undertaking
an essentially adjudicative task there needs to be the greatest
concern for independence. Here, the analogy to the judiciary is most
appropriate. This is not to say that the precise methods of the
judiciary have to be adopted, but that structural measures, somewhat
analogous to those applied to the judiciary, need to be adopted to
ensure that, in actuality and in public perception, administrative
This requires
tribunal adjudication is made on an independent basis.
a reconsideration of tenure, length of appointments, the process by
which appointments are made, pension provisions, role of staff, use
Important as these matters are, I
of ex parte contacts and the like.
think that it would be most useful if I were to look somewhat further
into the relationship between the role of administrative tribunals
and the need for independence.
Let me start by reiterating that it is only some adjudication, let alone all the other eleven activities just identified, that
While it is, of course, true,
is similar to what is done by courts.
particularly in our "brave new Charter world," that courts do much
more than apply known rules to facts, administrative tribunals all
too often are faced with "a large element of choice about social
values".
While the difference between typical judicial adjudication

4/ J. M. Evans, H. N. Janisch, D. J. Mullan & R. C. B. Risk,
Cases, Text and Materials, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Administrative Law:
Edmond Montgomery, 1984), pp. 6-7.

and typical administrative adjudication must now be recognized as one
of degree only, it remains a difference of importance.
On this
matter, I take my advice from Oliver Wendall Holmes, who observed:
I have heard it suggested that the difference is one of
degree.
I am the last man in the world to quarrel with a
distinction simply because it is one of degree. Most
distinctions, in m ,opinion, are of that sort, and are none
the worse for it.

2.

-

Independent Regulatory Agencies

One front on which there continues to be considerable
difference of opinion concerns the relationship that should exist
between what are popularly called "independent regulatory agencies"
and the rest of government. These include tribunals such as provincial public utility boards, and, at the federal level, bodies such as
the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. As
well, two additional major independent regulatory agencies are soon

5/ Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
78

562 at 631

(1906).

to be established -- one in Ontario to regulate 7 ,nsurance rates
and a federal agency to regulate postal rates. Of course, here, "independence" can in no sense be absolute.
As George Bernard Shaw once remarked:
"Independence? That's middle
class blasphemy. We are all dependent on each other, every soul of

6/ Regina Hickl-Szabo & Angela Barnes, "Ontario to Curb Car
Insurance Rates, Industry Profits will be Regulated," Globe
Mail,
April 24, 1987, p. Al; "Insurers Cite $100 million Loss, Offer to
Open Books," "Don't expect Premium Rollbacks or Big Rebates, Public
Cautioned," id., April 25, 1987, p. A5; Stanley Oziewicz, "Car
Insurance Body to Control Increases in Other Premiums," id., May 7,
1981, p. Al.
The Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations described the
proposed new independent regulatory agency for insurance rates in
these terms:
We will establish a permanent independent Rate Review
Board.
It will be led by a full-time chairperson and a
panel of part-time members. The Board will be supported by
a secretariat which will maintain public information on
rates and administer the public hearing process.
In making its rulings, the Rate Review Board will take
into account public policy guidelines issued by the
government.
Decisions of the Board may be reviewed by the courts.
Monte Kwinter, "Need Rate Review Board for Insurance Industry,"
The Lawyers Weekly, May 15, 1987, p. 4.
Subsequently, when the Minister was asked whether Cabinet would
be able to overturn abnormally large increases in rates, he indicated
"the Government will accept the review board's judgment, whatever it
is.
Mr. Kwinter said the only way to reverse a decision of the
review board would be to take it to the courts".
"Won't Overrule
Review Board on Auto Rates, Kwinter Insists," Globe & Mail, May 12,
1987, p. A8.
7/ "Postal Study to Consider Rate Setting,"
1987, p. A3.

Globe & Mail, April 2,

us on earth." 8/ Thus, an independent regulatory agency is created
and empowered by the Legislature, and as a creature of Parliament it
can always be abolished (witness the demise of the Canadian Transport
Commission), restructured or given a different mandate.
It will
usually be directly dependent on the Legislature, 9 r more realistically the government of the day, for its budget. /say "usually"
because some regulatory agencies are self-financing, and, under
very recent federal legislation, the C.R.T.C. has bx empowered to
levy its costs against those who appear before it. ) As well, the
government has the power of appointment and control over staff size
and composition. Nevertheless, even though its independence must of
necessity be limited, an independent regulatory agency remains quite
distinct from an hierarchically organized government department in
that it is not directly answerable to any Minister, has commissioners
who have fixed terms and some degree of tenure, and, through its
processes for public participation, has the means of legitimating its
activities and carving out a separate existence for itself.
The greatest faith in regulation by independent agenj s
was to be expressed in the United States during the New Deal. The objective then was to get regulation out of politics into the

8/ Pygmalion, Act II.
9/ As Landis was to observe, "[i]t must be remembered that whether
or not the administrative [agency] is organized along independent
lines, its dependence upon other departments of government is very
great. The executive and legislative [branches] control both the
means of supply and the extent of the agency's powers.
Supply is the
lifeblood of efficient administration and access to the means of
supply is a closely confined process in our government":
Administrative Process, note 2, above, at p. 60.
10/ For example, Nova Scotia, Public Utilities Act, R.S.N.S. 1967,
c. 258, ss.
1/

13-16.

An Act to Amend the Railway Act, S.C. 1986, c. 49.

12/ As Landis wrote in the late 1930's, "[tlhe administration
process is, in essence, our generation's answer to the inadequacy of
the judicial and the legislative processes":
Administrative Process,
note 2, above, at p. 46.
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hands of independent experts.
Joseph Eastman, himself a longtime
regulator, did not pull any punches when he said:
To be successful, they [independent regulatory agencies]
must be masters of their own souls, and known to be such.
It is the duty of the President to determine their personnel
through the power of appointment, and it is the duty of
Congress to determine by statute the policies which they
are to administer; but in the administration of those
policies, these tribunals must not be under the domination
or influence of either the President or Congress or of
anything else than their own independent judgment of the
facts and the law. They must also be in position and ready
to give free and untrammeled advice to both the President
and Congress at any time ups/request. Political domination
will ruin such a tribunal. But what, it may well be asked, of responsibility? Who would guard
the guardian,
For James Landis, the greatest of the New Deal
regulators, responsibility was not to be attained through the
fragmented political process but by concentrating responsibility in a
regulatory commission. As he explained:
Placing responsibility directly upon a specific group means
that a finger can be publicly pointed at a particular man
or men who are charged with the solution of a particular
question. This localization of responsibility gives, in
turn, to these positions a real attraction for men whose
sole urge for public service is the oi9
7 rtunity it affords
for the satisfaction of achievement. While I find these ideas greatly overstated, 6/ I wish to return to
This is because it seems that
them at the conclusion of this paper.

13/ G. Lloyd Wilson, ed.,
B. Eastman, 1942-44 (N.Y.:

Selected Papers and Addresses of Joseph
Simmons-Boardman, 1948) p. 375.

14/ For an excellent biographical study, see Thomas K. McCraw,
Harvard University Press,
Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.:
1984), ch. 5, "Landis and the Statecraft of the SEC," pp. 153-209.
15/ Administrative Process, note 2, above, at p. 28.
16/ The classic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
(Footnote Continued)
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we have moved so far from what now appears to have been a somewhat
naive faith in independent regulation and belief in the self disciplin
of "localized responsibility", "public service" and the "satisfactions
of achievement" toward the complete politicization of regulation,
that something of abiding value may have been lost in the process.
That to one side for a moment, I should point out that the concept of
independence for regulatory agencies fitted, initially at least,
somewhat comfortably into the American congressional system of
government.
The notion of independent bodies whose decisions could only
be reversed by Act of Congress and not by the President or Congressional Committee rests on the peculiarly American version of the
separation of powers doctrine and Congress's reluctance to see 17/
regulation become subject exclusively to presidential control. Despite this hospitable climate of widely diffused political authoritl
there has been persistent concern over the lack of effective political
accountability ever since independent regulatory agencies were
denounced in 1937 as constituting a P'headless fourth branch of
government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers". L-- In 1971, the Ash Council emphasized that
[a]ccountability is an essential element of democratic
government. Congress and the President are accountable to
the people for the performance of government. In turn,
agencies of government headed by appointed officials should

(Footnote Continued)
independent regulation remains Marver H. Bernstein, Reaulating
Business by Independent Commission (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1955).
17/ It is interesting to note that of all the democratic institutions imposed on Japan at the end of World War II, independent
regulatory commissions were the most quickly rejected. See Youichi
Ito, "Telecommunications and Industrial Policies in Japan" in
Marcellus Snow, ed., Market Place for Telecommunications Regulation
and Dereculation in Industrialized Democracies (New York: Longman,
1986), p. 201 at pp. 210-211. They appear not to have suffered from
this decision!
18/ U.S., Report of the President's Committee on Administrative
Management in the Federal Government (The Brownlow Committee)
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 40.
82

be responsive and responsible to Congress, tol
and through them, ultimately, to the public. -

e Executive,

By the late 1970's, proposals for reform included:
across-the-board
legislative veto power of agency rules; combined legislativepresidential veto; tighter control over appointments; narrower, more
precise delegation of authority to 2 5encies; sunset legislation; and
In the 1980's, there have been
improved congressional oversight. concerted eff j s to bring the agencies under closer White House
supervision, and thwarted efforts by Congress to assert a legislative veto. Z2
It now a
ars that regulatory agency autonomy is
coming back into fashion. Continuing disillusionment with
politics, from Watergate to the Iran-Contra affair, brings with it

19/ U.S., The President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, A New Regulatory Framework, Report on Selected Independent
Regulatory Agencies (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1981),

p.

40.

20/ See H. N. Janisch, "Policy Making in Regulation:
Towards a
New Definition of the Status of Independent Regulatory Agencies in
Canada" (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall L.J. 46 at 59-61.
21/ For an assessment, see Christopher C. de Muth, "Constraining
Regulatory Costs - The White House Programs," Jan/Feb 1980 Regulation, p. 13; George Eads, "Harnessing Regulation:
The Evolving Role
Df White House Oversight," id., May/June 1981, p. 19.
22/ In INS v. Chadha, 424 U.S. 919 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down all forms of the legislative veto (under which Congress
conditioned delegations of statutory authority by authorizing one or
both of its houses to invalidate executive implementation by passing
a resolution) as inconsistent with the requirements of Article 1 of
the Constitution that all legislation be passed by both houses of
Congress and presented to the President for his signature or veto.
or a particularly valuable analysis of Chadha, see Peter L. Strauss,
'Was There A Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's
Legislative Veto Decision" (1983), Duke L.J. 789.
23/ See, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, "In Defence of
kdministrative Agency Autonomy" (1987), 96 Yale L.J. 787.
For a
:omprehensive review of the still unsettled place of independent
-egulatory agencies in the U.S. system of government, see "A
3ymposium on Administrative Law:
'The Uneasy Constitutional Status
)f the Administrative Agencies'" (1987), 36 American University
.Rev. 277-601.

nostalgia for Eastman, Landis and the "independent judgment" of those
whose "sole urge" is for "public service".
3.

Canada and "Structural Heretics"

Despite all these high-sounding ptoposals for reform in the
United States, there has, in reality, been no fundamental move away
from reliance on independent regulatory agencies except, of course,
where deregulation, as in the case of the Civil Aviation Board, has
allowed for abolition. However, in a typically quiet Canadian
approach, we have moved,
9 ecially at the federal level, quite far
from the American model.
Impetus for this shift has come from our continuing inabilit
to reconcile our parliamentary system of government, in which there
is no separation between the Executive and the Legislature, with
independent agencies that are not accountable through a Minister to
Parliament. In a strict constitutional sense, as J. E. Hodgetts
insists, independent regulatory agencies are "structural heretics".
However, notwithstanding the views of purists, these agencies have
been made to serve a useful purpose, and it has only been quite
recently that their legitimacy has been seriously called into question
This is because regulation is now seen, not as an arcane technical
exercise best left to experts, but as an inherently political activity
fraught with opportunities for redistributing wealth. Once it is
recogn ivd that there will be winners and losers in the regulatory
game, the need arises for political involvement in the regulatory
process itself.
Historically, the necessary political involvement has been
achieved by way of appeals to Cabinet -- something, you will recall,
that is simply impossible in the American model. A particularly
attractive feature for politicians of Cabinet appeals is that it

24/ For details on the differences between the U.S. and Canadian
models, see "Policy Making in Regulation," note 19, above, at
pp. 56-88.
25/ J. E. Hodgetts, The Canadian Public Service (Toronto:
Press, 1973), pp. 143-147.

U. of T.

26/ See, for example, H. N. Janisch, "Winners and Losers in Telecommunications Competition" in W. T. Stanbury, ed., Telecommunications Policy and Regulation: The Impact of Competition and Technological Chanae (Montreal: I.R.P.P., 1986), pp. 307-400.

allows them to hold back, leaving regulators to make unpopular
decisions.
Should it become apparent that any decision is too
politically unpopular, the politicians can intervene and save the
day. Should a decision be unpopular, but not decisively so, it will
be declared to be a technical issue best left to experts. This
allows for what D~qlas Hartle has insightfully called "selective
accountability". Despite this, by the mid-1970's it was becoming apparent
that this type of limited ex post intervention was not in itself
adequate and that an ex ante power was called for.
Rather than an
after-the-event negative power to vary and rescind, what was now
envisaged was some form of positive policy direction power. This was
justified on the ground that it was inappropriate in a parliamentary
system of government for a regulatory agency to be making major
policy decisions. As Marcel Masse explained with respect to recently
proposed legislation governing telecommunications,
[t]he purpose of the provisions concerning the government's
power of direction is to establish clearly and unequivocally
that only the government, which is accountable to parliament
for its actions, is empowered to develop major telecommunications policies. This responsibility should not be borne
by the C.R.T.C. since it is a quasi-judicial organization
that does At
have to answer to the public for its
actions. However, as Pierre Juneau has forcefully pointed out, regulatory
agencies, even though admittedly not elected bodies, can act as
unique forums for direct political participation:
I believe that agencies of this kind are remarkable instruments for public participation. There has been and there
still is a fair amount of criticism about such agencies.
They are said to have too much power, that their members
are not elected officials and so on. While I'm sure that
in some respects this may be true, the question I think we
should ask ourselves is, compared to what. There are few
public bodies who spend much time hearing what the public

27/ See Douglas G. Hartle, Public Policy Decision Making and Regulation (Montreal: I.R.P.P., 1979).
28/ Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture, Issue 10, May 6, 1985,
10:4.

has to say and actually debating matters with the members
of the public that affect their interests.
One can consider
more conventional government departments, for instance,
where much less debate takes place with interested parties.
Even parliamentary committees which sometimes meet with the
public unfortunately have so many things to deal with that
they can't afford very much time for this activity.
The
Royal Commissions do spend a lot of time dealing with the
public but they have limited lives and purposes and do not
make decisions. Our experience at the C.R.T.C. was that if
the proper hearing measures are adopted, they provide an
extraordinry way of establishing a dialogue with the
public.

-

The working out of these seemingly irreconcilable demands of representational and participatory democracy provides the essential
context in which to assess current developments.

29/ Speakers' Remarks, Seminar for Members of Federal Administrative
Tribunals, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1978, p. 64.
For an anguished account by a former Minister of Transport of the
inability of government to impose a new policy direction on independent regulatory agencies, see Lloyd Axworthy, "Control of Policy,"
Policy Options, April 1985, p. 17.
He concluded at p. 20:
Under existing practice and legislation, the government has
little opportunity to make the CTC [Canadian Transport
Commission] do things it is not interested in doing.
Previous studies have clearly shown the limitations of a
government's appointment powers.
While the Governor in
Council has sweeping powers to review any decision of the
C.R.T.C., this authority is constrained by the simple
inability of limited resources to monitor the agency. We
should clearly redefine the relationship between the CTC
and the government so that elected representatives have the
ability to make policy. This could be achieved by
amendments to the NTA [National Transportation Act] or, at
the very least, a regular, systematic review of CTC
decisions followed by government policy statements.
In the National Transportation Act 1987 (Bill C-18, 1st Reading
November 4, 1986, 2d Reading February 4, 1987) the Governor in
Council will be authorized by Sections 23-26 to issue policy directions to the new National Transportation Agency.
86

In the second half of the 1970's, a flurry of studies o 0 /
the regulatory process included
se by the Lambert Commission,
the Ecoiric Council of Canada, the Law Reform ColIssion of
These were
Canada and the Peterson Parliamentary Committee. accompanied, and to s?V extent influenced, by the writing of
concerned academics.
The common theme throughout was that it
would be appropriate to provide for a power of policy direction, but
that great care should be taken to protect the integrity of the
regulatory process, es~gially its long tradition of open, participatory decision making. -

tion:

Policy directions were proposed in four pieces of legisl
first, in 1977 and 1978 in the new telecommunications Act;

1/

30/ Final Report of the Royal Commission on Financial Management &
Accountability (Ottawa: Min. Supply and Services Canada, 1979),
pp. 317-319.
31/ Responsible Regulation

(Ottawa:

E.C.C.,

1979),

pp. 53-68.

32/ Independent Administrative Agencies (Ottawa: Min. Supply and
Services Canada, 1980 (Working Paper 25)), pp. 84-93.
33/ Report of House of Commons Special Committee on Regulatory Reform
(Ottawa, 1980), pp. 14-21.
34/ See, for example, Richard Schultz, Federalism and the Regulatory
Process (Montreal: I.R.P.P., 1979); Lucinda Vandervort, Political
Fontrol of Independent Administrative Agencies (Ottawa: Law Reform
ommission of Canada, 1979); H. N. Janisch, The Regulatory Process
f the Canadian Transport Commission (Ottawa: Min. Supply and
ervices Canada, 1978); "The Role of the Independent Regulatory
gency in Canada," (1978) 27 U.N.B.L.J. 83 and "Policy Making in
egulation," note 19, above.
35/ As Richard Shultz put it, "[i]n general, regulatory agencies
provide an excellent and valuable opportunity for much public input
and discussion of regulatory matters.
It would be most regrettable
of, as a consequence of the desire to effect greater political
control over policy matters, such open participation was lost":
Federalism and the Regulatory Process, note 33, above, at p. 73.
36/ Bill C-16, An Act Respecting Telecommunications in Canada, 1st
eading, November 9, 1978, Section 9.

(less comprehensive telesecond, in the first version of Bill S0
communications legislaWn) in 1984; 7 third, in a second version
and fourth, in the amended version of
of Bill C-20 in 1985; Bill C-20, which cleared tho 9 tanding Committee on Communications and
When asked to offer an assessment of
Culture in November, 1985. the latest iteration of Bill C-20 at the Law Society of Upper Canada's
Conference on Communications Law and Policy in April, 1986, it was
possible to be quite upbeat about the way the legislation was evolving
In the original telecommunications legislation, the direction power was granted in the crudest form and resembled a
czarist ukase. It simply provided that the Governor in
Council could issue directions respecting the implementation
of the proposed new telecommunications policy for Canada.
The only limits to this draconian power were with respect
to broadcasting licences.
In February, 1984, when the first version of Bill C-20 was
introduced, this power was somewhat softened. In the first
place, it was provided that the Commission could request a
direction. More importantly, it was provided that no
direction would take effect until a notice of the proposed
direction or the nature and subject matter of the proposed
direction had been laid before parliament for thirty days.
It was also provided that the thirty-day delay would not
apply to directions which only required the Commission to
hold hearings or make a report on any matter. This seemed
to be an indication that it was now recognized that the
regulator and its open hearing processes were still relevani
in policy making.
Further changes were contained in the second version of
Bill C-20 introduced by the present government in December,
1984. It was now provided that before a direction was
issued or notice laid before parliament, the Minister of

37/ Bill C-20, An Act Respecting Bell Canada, etc., lst Reading,
February 8, 1984, Section 15.
38/ Bill C-20, An Act to Ammend the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Act, etc., 1st Reading, December 20, 1984.
39/ Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture, Second Report to the House
on Bill C-20, Issue 30, Nov. 21, 1985, p. 30:3.
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Communications had to consult with the Executive Committee
of the C.R.T.C. with respect to the nature and subject
matter of the direction or notice.
Yet further significant changes were adopted by the Standing
Committee. First, directions were now specifically referred
to as "policy directions", second, it was required that the
actual draft direction be laid before parliament and thirty
days were defined as thirty sitting days, and third, in a
provision which I believe will be employed quite extensively,
it was provided that the cabinet could call on the C.R.T.C.
to hold hearings or make
orts on any matter coming
within its jurisdiction.
While these amendments did not go as far as the studies and academics
had recommended, it seemed at the time that they reflected a growing
sensitivity to the need to reconcile a direction power with the
strengths of an open regulatory process. A year later, there is less
room for optimism.
The cause for pessimism may be fo W
in the Teleglobe
Canada Reorganization and Divestiture Act,
which received Royal
Assent on April 1, 1987.
It contains a direction 4 2 wer in the form
of a throwback to earlier versions of Bill C-20. As Andr6 Bureau,
Chairman of the C.R.T.C., had pointed out in a spirited appearance
before the legislative committee, Bill C-38 was deficient in a number
of respects:
First, because of the difficulty involved in defining what
a policy direction is, it should be qualified as a policy
direction of general orientation.
Second, it is of great importance that before the issue of
any direction, there should be consultation with the public
through C.R.T.C.

process

. .

Third, no direction should be carrier specific

.

40/ H. N. Janisch, "Policy Making in Telecommunication Regulation:
An Assessment of Bill C-20" (1986),
41/ S.C. 1987, c. 12 (Bill C-38).
42/ See Section 15.

7 C.R.R. 5-1.1 at 5-13.

Fourth, no direction should be proposed between the expiration of any prescribed time for the filing of interventions
and the time of making a decision . .
Fifth, . . . the government should consult fully with the
executive committee of the commission, not only with regard
to the nature and subject of the direction but also with
regard to all the particulars of the proposed direction. 4
As well, he expressed the Commission's view that it should
not be subject to both directions and Cabinet app3s (government
intervention should be "at one end or the other" ) and if Cabinet
appeals were retained, they should be fairer to all parties concerned.
"At present", he noted "the rigt/to vary or rescind decisions is
exercised in a secret manner." Mr. Bureau was not to find a sympathetic audience because
the government was operating under a very tight privatization schedule
Conservative members insisted that Bill C-38 was not the right
occasion on which to deal with the whole issue of the appropriate
relationship that should exist between the C.R.T.C. and the rest of
government.
It was intimated that a new version of Bill C-20 would
provide a suitable forum for that debate, and that the Teleglobe
direction power should not be regarded as a precedent or as having
disposed of the matter of principle. Most regrettably, a Liberal
amendment, which proposed to take Conservative reassurances at their
face value and limit the open-ended direction power by way of a
sunset provision so as to allm/it to be replaced by a new version of
Bill C-20, was not accepted.
While I am not particularly persuaded by the "wrong forum
too little time" excuses for refiling on the significant improvements
that had been adopted by the Standing Committee in November 1985, as
a legal academic, I am required to be eternally optimistic, so I
will, at the conclusion of this paper, list some specific recommendations should a new Bill C-20 ever materialize. But before doing so,
I should call your attention to a full scale contemporary brouhahah
in Saskatchewan that shows dramatically that the question of the

43/ Canada, Minutes of Proceedinqs and Evidence of the Legislative
Committee on Bill C-38, Issue No. 3, March 17,
44/ Ibid.,

3:27.

45/ Ibid.,

3:28.

46/ Ibid, Issue 4, March 18, 1987, p. 4:69.

1987, pp. 3:27-28.

relationship between governments and independent regulatory agencies
is not confined to the complex world of Ottawa.
Saskatchewan has not had a history of independent regulation,
preferring government 4 wnership and direct accountability to the
In 1982, the Conservatives, who had long
Legislature instead. complained of N.D.P. manipulation of Crown corporatis, were elected
Public
on a promise of independent public utility review. was soon
Utilities Review Commission (P.U.R.C.) set up that year to be disowned by its creators once t 1 /downside political risks of
agency independence became apparent. P.U.R.C. has taken its
independence seriously, and when the government sought to override
its decisions in legally questionable ways, it took the matter to the
Court of Appeal by way of two stated cases. There, it won strong
endorsements of its stand.

47/ In this it differed from the approach adopted throughout North
America. Even where government ownership was adopted, as in Manitoba
and Alberta, for example, independent regulatory agencies were put in
place as well.
For an excellent new history of regulation in Canada
that makes this point, see Christopher Armstrong and H. V. Nelles,
The Organization and Regulation of Canadian UtilMonopoly's Moment:
ities, 1830-1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986).
ffrey York, "Politicians Snap at Saskatchewan Watchdog,"
ail, April 11, 1987, p. D2.
Public Utilities Review Commission Act, S.S. 1982,
50/ In the debate in 1982 over the P.U.R*C.'s creation, Gary Lane
"For too long rate increases were made in
told the Legislature:
secret, imposed on the people of Saskatchewan . . . who have waited
In
long enough for an independent agency (to monitor rate hikes)".
October, 1986, as Minister responsible for the P.U.R.C., he said, "We
need to ensure ultimately that the decision (on rates) that we had
made is upheld, and we will probably have to do that by legislation":
Gordon McIntyre, "Gov't Seems Sorry It Created P.U.R.C.," Leader Post,
Tan. 24, 1987, p. C8.
By April, 1987, he said that his government
would probably amend the legislation to make sure that the Cabinet
had the final say on utility rate setting. He was of the view that
P.U.R.C. was never designed to take away Cabinet or government
asponsibility":
Bruce Johnstone, Leader Post, April 4, 1987, p. C6.
91

In the first of these cases, the government sought to issue
a direction to the Commission after it had rendered a decision.
This, the Court held, amounted to an unauthorized Cabinet appeal as
the legisl
on only envisaged directions prior to a decision being
rendered. As well, the direction was held to be inconsistent
with the Commission's empowering Act, and the Court, in a pointed
rebuke, declared

this to be

". . . an unauthorized encroachment by

the executive branch of government on the powers and prerogatives of
the Legislative Assembly for the Province of Saskatchewan."
Even more important than the specifics was the Court's
sweeping vindication of regulatory independence, with its emphasis on
expertise and detached judgment, in that it was said that the Legislature had sought to establish an educated and politically insulated
commission. The Court's language was very similar to that employed
by Eastman and Landis:
After examining the Act as a whole, I conclude that the
Legislative Assembly for the Province of Saskatchewan
sought to create an independent ratesetter -- a commission
removed from the control of the Executive Council or
individual Ministers of the Crown in charge of public
corporations described in Section 3. Since the rates are
usually set by the Commission only after conducting public
hearings, the process is subject to public scrutiny in much
the same way as court proceedings.
If it were otherwise,
the process would be subject to the influence of lobbyists.
When the parties or interveners wish to make an application
or submission, they now must do so before the Commission
created for that purpose. In addition, the Legislative
Assembly for the Province of Saskatchewan undoubtedly
recognized that the increasing economic and accounting
complexity of ratesetting requires a commission armed with
sufficient professional staff to critically examine applications before it.
With this background one can readily
understand why the Legislative Assembly attempted to remove
undue rate discrimination, potential political influence
and activities on the part of lobbyists, by placing ratesetting in the hands of a commission, generally independent
of the executive branch of Government and more particularly
independent of individual Ministers of the Crown in charge

51/ Re Public Utilities Review Commission Act
at 63 (Sask. C.A.).
52/

Ibid., per Tallis J. A.,

at p. 64.

(1986) 52 Sask. R. 53

of public corporations. Although the Commission is subject
to the broad policy guidelines set forth in Section 6,
there is no suggestion in the legislative history that the
Legislative Assembly for the Province of Saskatchewan
sought to eliminate the ratesetters' discretion. On the
contrary, the Legislative Assembly for Saskatchewan sought
-insulated commission
to create an educated and political
to carry out the ratesetting task. Even more recently, the Court of Appeal has struck down another
order-in-council with respect to rural telephone rates as conflicting
with what the Commission is required to do under its statutory
mandate. That order-in-council had sought to force the Commission 5 .
comply, within a month, with a government-designed rate schedule. It now appears thatsthe P.U.R.C. will be abolished, ostenThis situation has been exacerbated
sibly on grounds of economy. by the P.U.R.C. granting the federal competition authorities standing
to intervene in a major Sasktel hearing. This has been denounced as

53/ Ibid., per Tallis J.A. at p. 61.
54/ See Bruce Johnstone, note 49, above. No formal written judgment
was rendered, the matter being dealt with by way of a summary oral
judgment from the bench. Note, however, that in a yet more recent
decision, the Court of Appeal for the Yukon Territory refused to
follow the Saskatchewan approach. See Re Ref. to Court of Appeal
Pursuant to Section 74 of Public Utilities Act Relative to the Effect
of Order-in-Council 1986/178, May 26, 1987. Seaton J.A., speaking on
behalf of the Court, concluded that the Yukon Utilities Board had not
been set up as fully an independent ratesetter as had the P.U.R.C.
While it is possible to identify certain technical distinctions, what
cannot be reconciled in the Court of Appeal decision is the difference
in overall approach to the relationship that should exist between a
regulatory agency and government. Here, the starting point for
It is to be hoped
analysis is particularly crucial to the outcome.
that this issue will eventually be dealt with by the Supreme Court of
Canada, although it seems unlikely that leave to appeal will be
sought in these particular cases.
55/ "Saskatchewan to Cut Consumer Watchdog," Globe & Mail, May 14,
1987, p. A3.

a "back-door attempt" by the federal authorities to get inform ton
about the provincially owned and regulated telephone company.All this makes for great prime time political drama.
However, we should not lose sight, in the confusion of battle, of the
underlying cause of this ruckus; namely, the lack of understanding
and agreement as to the appropriate role of an independent regulatory
agency in a parliamentary system of government.
4.

Conclusion

As indicated earlier, I will conclude with a number of
recommendations.
First, I agree with Andr6 Bureau that directions should not
be specific or they will turn the regulators into mere implementers
without independent judgment.
If, in fact, all that is wanted are
implementers of policy, we should give up on indepen~gjt regulatory
agencies in favour of departmental decision making. Therefore,
directives should be confined to matters of "general policy".

56/ Leader Post, April 3, 1987.
57/ Canadian legislators should bear in mind some sound observations
from New Zealand, where the Public and Administrative Law Reform
Committee recommended that directions should be restricted to considerations of "general policy".
It went on to observe:
It is difficult to draw a line betwen specific and general
policy directions. However, the Committee considers that
although it may be acceptable for a policy direction to be
given about a particular kind of situation in some instances, directions should not be given where they might
interfere with:
(a) the duty of independent tribunals to act judicially
(b) the determination of individual applications,
allegations or cases which relate to a particular person or
organization.
The Committee endorses the formula used in the proviso to
Section 68(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1976, which provides:
(Footnote Continued)

Second, there g ould be what Andr6 Bureau well described as
that is to say, no direction50ould be
a "no-hunting season"'; It may be
given after the regulator is fully seized of a matter. necessary to have a stop order procedure so that the government may
put an application tWporarily on hold to allow it tire to formulate
a policy directive. Three, it is odd that there is, as yet, no formal provision
for public participation in direction formulation. This is quite out
of step with the federal gove[i@ent's general move towards advance
As the regulators already have
consultation in rule making. suitable mechanisms in place for consultation, provision should be
made for their use.

(Footnote Continued)
. . . nothing in this

subsection shall be construed as

authorizing the Minister to give any direction in respect
of any particular allegation or any particular complaint or
that would derogate from the duty of the Tribunal to act
judicially.
Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee, Nineteenth Report,
Queen's
Government Directions to Statutory Bodies (Wellington, N.Z.:
Printer, 1986), pp. 10-11.
58/ Minutes of Proceedings, note 42,
1987, p. 3:36.

above, Issue No. 3, March 17,

59/ Note that Bill C-18, National Transportation Act 1987, note 28,
above, provides in Section 23(2) that a direction "shall not affect a
matter that is before the Agency on the date of the direction and
that relates to a particular person".
60/ Consider the "refrain directive" proposed by Louise Martin and
Ken Wyman in their advice to the Nielson Task Force, Re ulatory
Agencies, A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Prqgram Review,
1985, p. 20.
61/ While it is true that there still is no general statutory
requirement for advance consultation, political commitment and
practice provide extensive opportunities for such participation in
rule making. See H. N. Janisch, "Changing Attitudes Towards Rule
Making" in Administrative Law, note 3, above, 1986/87 Supplemental
Materials, pp. 50-57.

Fourth, and finally, what I have long called the "double
whammy" effect of directions and Cabin,/appeals will likely undermine
self-confidence and sense of purpose. I would prefer to see
directions only, with the courts playing backup. The double whammy
effect is simply too destabilizing. Not only will it undermine the
regulators' willingness to get on with difficult policy decisions,
but it will create a public perception of the regulatory agency as
being only a stepping stone in a political-lobbying process.
Let me end by reminding you of what lies behind the immediate
details of the appropriate form of directions or appeals. As both
Eastman and Landis recognized, if you wish to have independence of
judgment, you have to create conditions in which independence of
thought will thrive. You cannot have one without the other. You
cannot turn regulators into the jam in the political sandwich and
then expect them to act in an independent and responsible manner.
This is not to say that I favour unalloyed independence, but that, in
bringing regulation more into line with parliamentary accountability,
great care must be taken to insure that the cure is not worse than
the disease. Most importantly it must always be borne in mind that,
as Louis Brandeis astutely obserW 9 of human nature, "[r]esponsibility
is the great developer of men". -

62/ "The Role of the Independent Regulatory Agency in Canada,"
note 33, above, at pp. 108-111.
63/

St. Joseph's Stockyard Co. v. U.S.,

298 U.S. 38 at 92

(1936).

